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Abstract
This paper uses a mixed oligopoly model to examine the relationship between the
privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue. From a public
choice viewpoint, we assume the government prefers tax revenue to the sum of consumer and
producer surplus, whereas the public firm only cares about the sum of consumer and
producer surplus. The results indicate that if the government sufficiently prefers tax revenue,
it will not privatize the public firm.
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During the past two decades, a number of theoretical studies have con-
cerned privatization.1 Most of these studies use a mixed oligopoly model,
where a public ﬁrm maximizing social welfare, or the sum of consumer and
producer surplus, competes with private ﬁrms maximizing their own proﬁts
in Cournot or Stacklberg competition. Their main concern has been how the
number of private ﬁrms aﬀects the privatization of the public ﬁrm.
White (1996) and Fjell and Heywood (2004) introduced a production sub-
sidy into the mixed oligopoly model. These works typically assume that both
the government and the public ﬁrm are benevolent in that they maximize
social welfare (the sum of consumer and producer surplus less the subsidy).
As a result, they conclude that the government should subsidize production
in the mixed oligopoly. However, from a public choice viewpoint, it does
not seem adequate to assume that the government and the public ﬁrm are
benevolent. Instead, it is reasonable to consider that the government and
the public ﬁrm have the following two features.
First, the government may prefer tax revenue to the sum of consumer
and producer surplus; that is, the government may not be benevolent.2 The
extreme case is a Leviathan government that seeks to maximize only tax
revenue.3 In this case, the government’s optimal policy is to tax production
rather than to subsidize it.4
Second, the objective of the public ﬁrm may diﬀer from that of the govern-
ment. One characteristic of bureaucracies is a division of functions between
diﬀerent agencies. In general, because the public ﬁrm is not a tax collection
agency, the public ﬁrm does not care about tax revenue but instead cares
about the sum of consumer and producer surplus.
In this analysis we assume that the government puts a larger weight on
tax revenue than on the sum of consumer and producer surplus, whereas the
public ﬁrm only cares about the sum of consumer and producer surplus. In
this context, we examine the relationship between the privatization of the
public ﬁrm and the government preferences for tax revenue.
The main results of this paper are as follows. First, the government
1For a detailed survey, see De Fraja and Delbono (1990).
2Matsumura (1998) also assumes that the objective function of the government is not
social welfare. Unlike our model, however, he assumes that the government puts a larger
weight on consumer surplus than on producer surplus.
3For a detailed explanation of the Leviathan government, see Brennan and Buchannan
(1980).
4Mujumdar and Pal (1998) and De Fraja (1991) are exceptions. Although they incor-
porate tax into a mixed oligopoly model, they do not investigate the optimal tax scheme.
1sets a higher tax rate in a mixed oligopoly than in a privatized oligopoly.
Second, whether the government privatizes the public ﬁrm depends on the
government preference for tax revenue.
2 The model
2.1 The mixed oligopoly
We consider a mixed oligopoly model where a public ﬁrm (ﬁrm 0) and a
private ﬁrm (ﬁrm 1) compete in a market. Both ﬁrms produce a homogeneous
good and sell it in the market. An inverse demand function is given by
p =1−Q, where p is the market price and Q is the total output. This total
output is Q = q0 + q1, where q0 and q1 are the outputs of the public ﬁrm
and the private ﬁrm, respectively. Both ﬁrms have the same cost function,
C(qi)=kq2
i/2, i =0 ,1 . 5 In what follows, we set k = 1 for simplicity. A
speciﬁc tax rate is imposed on both ﬁrms.
It is assumed that both ﬁrms play a Cournot–Nash game; that is, they
simultaneously choose output. The private ﬁrm chooses output so as to
maximize the following proﬁt function:





where t is the speciﬁc tax rate. On the other hand, the public ﬁrm chooses










where T(≡ tQ) is the tax revenue.6 From the ﬁrst-order conditions, the









5To focus on the tax revenue, neither eﬃciency nor the problem of entry is taken into
consideration, so we ignore ﬁxed cost.
6Following De Fraja (1991), in this paper we assume that the public ﬁrm only cares
about the sum of consumer and producer surplus. If the public ﬁrm cares not only about
the sum but also about the tax revenue or subsidy, T is cancelled out in equation (2), as
in White (1996), Fjell and Heywood (2004), and Mujumdar and Pal (1998). Under this
setting, even if the government puts a larger weight on the tax revenue than on the sum
of both surpluses, it never privatizes the public ﬁrm.
2The government’s payoﬀ is given by:
U = W +( 1+α)T, (5)
where α is the parameter representing the weight of the government pref-
erence for the tax revenue. Since we are interested in the case where the
government puts a larger weight on T than on W, we set α ≥ 0.7 If α =0 ,
the government puts the same weight on W and T. In this case, because the
government’s payoﬀ represents social welfare, the government is benevolent.
To the contrary, the greater α becomes, the more the government cares about
T. In particular, if α approximates inﬁnity, the government cares only about
T; that is, the government is a Leviathan.





(1 − t)[8 + t(7 + 15α)]. (6)
When the government chooses t so as to maximize (6), the optimal tax rate







If the weight of the government preference for the tax revenue is suﬃciently
large (in the case of α>1/15), the optimal tax rate becomes positive.
Conversely, when it is small (in the case of 0 ≤ α<1/15), the optimal tax
rate becomes negative; in the case of α =1 /15, the optimal tax rate is zero.
We ﬁnd that the greater the weight of the government preference for the
tax revenue, the higher the tax rate the government imposes. This result is
intuitive and straightforward.
From (3), (4), (6) and (7), we can show the following equilibrium outcomes

























7If α<0, we can consider the case where the government puts a larger weight on W
than on T. However, we exclude this case because it is inconsistent with reality.
3As shown, every equilibrium outcome depends only on α. It should be noted
that as α becomes larger, the output of each ﬁrm, and therefore the total
output, decreases. This is because from (7), the optimal tax rate is positively
correlated with α. In addition, it is clear that the government’s payoﬀ is U-
shaped with respect to α.
2.2 The privatized oligopoly
Let us turn to the case of a privatized oligopoly where the public ﬁrm is
privatized without cost. The privatized ﬁrm now plans to maximize its proﬁt
by choosing output. As in the case of the mixed oligopoly, both ﬁrms play a
Cournot–Nash game. The outputs of both ﬁrms are expressed as follows:








(1 − t)[5 + t(3 + 8α)]. (13)
When the government chooses t so as to maximize (13), the optimal tax rate







If α>1/4, the optimal tax rate becomes positive; if 0 ≤ α<1/4, the
optimal tax rate becomes negative and therefore the government subsidizes
both ﬁrms; and if α =1 /4, the optimal tax rate becomes zero. This optimal
tax rate in the privatized oligopoly is also increasing in α as in the mixed
oligopoly.
From (12), (13) and (14), the outputs of both ﬁrms, the total output and





















respectively. As α becomes large, the optimal tax rate increases, and the
outputs of both ﬁrms thereby decrease. In addition, the government’s payoﬀ
is U-shaped with respect to α. These features are similar to the mixed
oligopoly case.
42.3 Comparisons
In this subsection, we compare the mixed and privatized oligopoly equilib-
ria. The diﬀerences in the optimal tax rates (or, possibly, the optimal subsidy














(1 + α)(12α − 1)







(1 + α)2(12α − 1)
4(3 + 8α)(7 + 15α)
, (20)
respectively. These results lead to the following two ﬁndings.
First, as long as α is ﬁnite, the optimal tax rate in the mixed oligopoly is
always higher than that in the privatized oligopoly. In addition, the diﬀerence
in the optimal tax rates between the mixed and privatized oligopoly cases
becomes smaller, when α becomes larger. Note that if α approaches inﬁnity,
the optimal tax rates in both the mixed and privatized oligopoly cases are
the same: t∗
m = t∗
p =1 /2 (see Figure 1).8
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Figure 1: The comparison of the optimal tax rates
Second, if α>1/12, both total output and the government’s payoﬀ in
the mixed oligopoly are larger than those in the privatized oligopoly. In this
8If α approaches inﬁnity, the government chooses the tax rate so as to maximize the
tax revenue. The ﬁrst-order condition is d(tQ)/dt = Q(1 +  ) = 0, where   represents the
elasticity of output with respect to the tax rate. Because the elasticities obtained in the
mixed and privatized oligopoly cases are the same, these tax rates are also identical.
5case, the government does not have an incentive to privatize the public ﬁrm.
In contrast, if 0 ≤ α<1/12, both total output and the government’s payoﬀ
in the mixed oligopoly are smaller than those in the privatized oligopoly,
so the government will privatize the public ﬁrm. Obviously, if α =1 /12,
Q∗
m = Q∗
p =1 3 /22 and U∗
m = U∗
p = 169/528 hold, then the government is
indiﬀerent to the choice regarding privatization. We have summarized these
results in Figure 2 and 3.











Figure 2: The comparison of total outputs











Figure 3: The comparison of the government’s payoﬀs
It should be noted that when total output in the mixed oligopoly is larger
than that in the privatized oligopoly, the government’s payoﬀ in the mixed
oligopoly is also larger than that in the privatized oligopoly. From (3), (4)
and (12), the diﬀerence in total outputs can be represented as a function of
tm and tp: Qm − Qp =( 1− 6tm +5 tp)/10. Therefore, we can see that the
diﬀerence is decreasing in tm and increasing in tp. If the government puts a
6suﬃciently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses,
i.e., if α>1/12, the diﬀerence in the optimal tax rates is small. In this
case, the government does not privatize the public ﬁrm. In contrast, if the
government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum
of both surpluses, i.e., if 0 ≤ α<1/12, the government will privatize the
public ﬁrm, because the diﬀerence in the optimal tax rates is suﬃciently
large.
3 Conclusion
In this analysis we used a mixed oligopoly model to examine the re-
lationship between the privatization of a public ﬁrm and the government
preferences for tax revenue. If the government suﬃciently prefers the tax
revenue to the sum of the consumer and producer surplus, it will not priva-
tize the public ﬁrm. This result may indicate that diﬀerences in the progress
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